TY - GEN
T1 - A Study on Evaluation Board Requirements for Assessing Vulnerability of Cryptographic Modules to Side-Channel Attacks
AU - Iokibe, Kengo
AU - Kan, Tomonobu
AU - Toyota, Yoshitaka
PY - 2020/7
Y1 - 2020/7
N2 - We studied for specifying requirements for side-channel attack (SCA) vulnerability evaluation boards. SCAs are a potential threat to cryptographic modules mounted in electronics products. Cryptographic modules are required to be evaluated in terms of vulnerability by using a test board. However, no reasonable requirements for such test boards have been specified. In this paper, we investigated the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of side-channel leakage and the transfer impedance from the side-channel leakage source to an observation port where side-channel leakage is probed in an evaluation board. We examined two models of existing SCA vulnerability evaluation boards that implemented the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Results suggest that cryptographic modules need to provide SNRs of side-channel leakage greater than 2 dB for implementations of the cryptographic algorithm involving no SCA countermeasures. It is also inferred that the transfer impedance needs to satisfy two conflicting requirements. The transfer impedance should be as large as possible, considering the ease of evaluation. At the same time, the transfer impedance needs to be low enough to suppress fluctuations in the power supply voltage and guarantee evaluation in a state equivalent to the actual operating state of the IC. Coaxial connectors would be recommended to be implemented for increasing the SNR and for reproducibility of measurements.
AB - We studied for specifying requirements for side-channel attack (SCA) vulnerability evaluation boards. SCAs are a potential threat to cryptographic modules mounted in electronics products. Cryptographic modules are required to be evaluated in terms of vulnerability by using a test board. However, no reasonable requirements for such test boards have been specified. In this paper, we investigated the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of side-channel leakage and the transfer impedance from the side-channel leakage source to an observation port where side-channel leakage is probed in an evaluation board. We examined two models of existing SCA vulnerability evaluation boards that implemented the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Results suggest that cryptographic modules need to provide SNRs of side-channel leakage greater than 2 dB for implementations of the cryptographic algorithm involving no SCA countermeasures. It is also inferred that the transfer impedance needs to satisfy two conflicting requirements. The transfer impedance should be as large as possible, considering the ease of evaluation. At the same time, the transfer impedance needs to be low enough to suppress fluctuations in the power supply voltage and guarantee evaluation in a state equivalent to the actual operating state of the IC. Coaxial connectors would be recommended to be implemented for increasing the SNR and for reproducibility of measurements.
KW - cryptographic module
KW - evaluation board
KW - side-channel attack
KW - signal-to-noise ratio
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U2 - 10.1109/EMCSI38923.2020.9191655
DO - 10.1109/EMCSI38923.2020.9191655
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85091876010
T3 - 2020 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility and Signal/Power Integrity, EMCSI 2020
SP - 528
EP - 531
BT - 2020 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility and Signal/Power Integrity, EMCSI 2020
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2020 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility and Signal/Power Integrity, EMCSI 2020
Y2 - 28 July 2020 through 28 August 2020
ER -