Consideration of the side-channel attack to SIMON implemented on Arduino Uno

Harunobu Enami; Yuta Kodera; Takuya Kusaka; Yasuyuki Nogami

doi:10.1109/CANDARW53999.2021.00075

Consideration of the side-channel attack to SIMON implemented on Arduino Uno

Harunobu Enami, Yuta Kodera, Takuya Kusaka, Yasuyuki Nogami

School of Engineering

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

In this research, the authors conducted the side-channel attack (SCA)for the XOR in the final round of "SIMON."As of 2021, there is no research about side-channel attacks against SIMON, which makes this paper more worthwhile. As a result, the authors could attack with little computational resources and time, which means that "SIMON"can be weak against side-channel attacks. Furthermore, the authors checked the relationship between the hamming-weight of the round key and the easiness of attacking. The authors confirmed that there was no relationship between them.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Proceedings - 2021 9th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2021
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages	412-415
Number of pages	4
ISBN (Electronic)	9781665428354
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/CANDARW53999.2021.00075
Publication status	Published - 2021
Event	9th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2021 - Virtual, Online, Japan Duration: Nov 23 2021 → Nov 26 2021

Publication series

Name	Proceedings - 2021 9th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2021

Conference

Conference	9th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2021
Country/Territory	Japan
City	Virtual, Online
Period	11/23/21 → 11/26/21

Keywords

information security
lightweight cipher
side-channel attack
SIMON

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Artificial Intelligence
Computer Networks and Communications
Information Systems
Software

Access to Document

10.1109/CANDARW53999.2021.00075

Cite this

Enami, H., Kodera, Y., Kusaka, T., & Nogami, Y. (2021). Consideration of the side-channel attack to SIMON implemented on Arduino Uno. In Proceedings - 2021 9th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2021 (pp. 412-415). (Proceedings - 2021 9th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2021). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/CANDARW53999.2021.00075

Consideration of the side-channel attack to SIMON implemented on Arduino Uno. / Enami, Harunobu; Kodera, Yuta; Kusaka, Takuya et al.
Proceedings - 2021 9th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2021. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2021. p. 412-415 (Proceedings - 2021 9th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2021).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Enami, H, Kodera, Y, Kusaka, T & Nogami, Y 2021, Consideration of the side-channel attack to SIMON implemented on Arduino Uno. in Proceedings - 2021 9th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2021. Proceedings - 2021 9th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2021, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 412-415, 9th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2021, Virtual, Online, Japan, 11/23/21. https://doi.org/10.1109/CANDARW53999.2021.00075

Enami H, Kodera Y, Kusaka T, Nogami Y. Consideration of the side-channel attack to SIMON implemented on Arduino Uno. In Proceedings - 2021 9th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2021. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2021. p. 412-415. (Proceedings - 2021 9th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2021). doi: 10.1109/CANDARW53999.2021.00075

Enami, Harunobu ; Kodera, Yuta ; Kusaka, Takuya et al. / Consideration of the side-channel attack to SIMON implemented on Arduino Uno. Proceedings - 2021 9th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2021. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2021. pp. 412-415 (Proceedings - 2021 9th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2021).

@inproceedings{4eb00c5775ac435ebac1cc1678fae392,

title = "Consideration of the side-channel attack to SIMON implemented on Arduino Uno",

abstract = "In this research, the authors conducted the side-channel attack (SCA)for the XOR in the final round of {"}SIMON.{"}As of 2021, there is no research about side-channel attacks against SIMON, which makes this paper more worthwhile. As a result, the authors could attack with little computational resources and time, which means that {"}SIMON{"}can be weak against side-channel attacks. Furthermore, the authors checked the relationship between the hamming-weight of the round key and the easiness of attacking. The authors confirmed that there was no relationship between them. ",

keywords = "information security, lightweight cipher, side-channel attack, SIMON",

author = "Harunobu Enami and Yuta Kodera and Takuya Kusaka and Yasuyuki Nogami",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021 IEEE.; 9th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2021 ; Conference date: 23-11-2021 Through 26-11-2021",

year = "2021",

doi = "10.1109/CANDARW53999.2021.00075",

language = "English",

series = "Proceedings - 2021 9th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2021",

publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",

pages = "412--415",

booktitle = "Proceedings - 2021 9th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2021",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Consideration of the side-channel attack to SIMON implemented on Arduino Uno

AU - Enami, Harunobu

AU - Kodera, Yuta

AU - Kusaka, Takuya

AU - Nogami, Yasuyuki

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - In this research, the authors conducted the side-channel attack (SCA)for the XOR in the final round of "SIMON."As of 2021, there is no research about side-channel attacks against SIMON, which makes this paper more worthwhile. As a result, the authors could attack with little computational resources and time, which means that "SIMON"can be weak against side-channel attacks. Furthermore, the authors checked the relationship between the hamming-weight of the round key and the easiness of attacking. The authors confirmed that there was no relationship between them.

AB - In this research, the authors conducted the side-channel attack (SCA)for the XOR in the final round of "SIMON."As of 2021, there is no research about side-channel attacks against SIMON, which makes this paper more worthwhile. As a result, the authors could attack with little computational resources and time, which means that "SIMON"can be weak against side-channel attacks. Furthermore, the authors checked the relationship between the hamming-weight of the round key and the easiness of attacking. The authors confirmed that there was no relationship between them.

KW - information security

KW - lightweight cipher

KW - side-channel attack

KW - SIMON

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85124164814&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85124164814&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/CANDARW53999.2021.00075

DO - 10.1109/CANDARW53999.2021.00075

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:85124164814

T3 - Proceedings - 2021 9th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2021

SP - 412

EP - 415

BT - Proceedings - 2021 9th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2021

PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

T2 - 9th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2021

Y2 - 23 November 2021 through 26 November 2021

ER -

Consideration of the side-channel attack to SIMON implemented on Arduino Uno

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this