TY - GEN
T1 - Detailed cost estimation of CNTW attack against EMV signature scheme
AU - Izu, Tetsuya
AU - Morikawa, Yoshitaka
AU - Nogami, Yasuyuki
AU - Sakemi, Yumi
AU - Takenaka, Masahiko
PY - 2012/5/29
Y1 - 2012/5/29
N2 - EMV signature is one of specifications for authenticating credit and debit card data, which is based on ISO/IEC 9796-2 signature scheme. At CRYPTO 2009, Coron, Naccache, Tibouchi, and Weinmann proposed a new forgery attack against the signature ISO/IEC 9796-2. They also briefly discussed the possibility when the attack is applied to the EMV signatures. They showed that the forging cost is $45,000 and concluded that the attack could not forge them for operational reason. However their results are derived from not fully analysis under only one condition. The condition they adopt is typical case. For security evaluation, fully analysis and an estimation in worst case are needed. This paper shows cost-estimation of CNTW attack against EMV signature in detail. We constitute an evaluate model and show cost-estimations under all conditions that Coron et al. do not estimate. As results, it has become clear that EMV signature can be forged with less than $2,000 according to a condition. This fact shows that CNTW attack might be a realistic threat.
AB - EMV signature is one of specifications for authenticating credit and debit card data, which is based on ISO/IEC 9796-2 signature scheme. At CRYPTO 2009, Coron, Naccache, Tibouchi, and Weinmann proposed a new forgery attack against the signature ISO/IEC 9796-2. They also briefly discussed the possibility when the attack is applied to the EMV signatures. They showed that the forging cost is $45,000 and concluded that the attack could not forge them for operational reason. However their results are derived from not fully analysis under only one condition. The condition they adopt is typical case. For security evaluation, fully analysis and an estimation in worst case are needed. This paper shows cost-estimation of CNTW attack against EMV signature in detail. We constitute an evaluate model and show cost-estimations under all conditions that Coron et al. do not estimate. As results, it has become clear that EMV signature can be forged with less than $2,000 according to a condition. This fact shows that CNTW attack might be a realistic threat.
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U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-29889-9_3
DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-29889-9_3
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84861431607
SN - 9783642298882
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 13
EP - 26
BT - Financial Cryptography and Data Security - FC 2011 Workshops, RLCPS and WECSR 2011, Revised Selected Papers
T2 - 15th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, FC 2011
Y2 - 28 February 2011 through 4 March 2011
ER -