@article{3003e7d6b07e4afe88a157c426c02e17,
title = "Exclusive contracts and bargaining power",
abstract = "Incorporating Nash bargaining into the standard one-buyer-one-supplier framework in the Chicago School critique, we show a possibility that an inefficient incumbent supplier can deter a socially efficient new supplier entry through exclusive contracts.",
keywords = "Antitrust policy, Entry deterrence, Exclusive contracts, Nash bargaining",
author = "Hiroshi Kitamura and Noriaki Matsushima and Misato Sato",
note = "Funding Information: This paper is a divided part of Kitamura et al. (2016b) “Exclusive Contracts with Complementary Inputs”. We extract Section 4.2 in Kitamura et al. (2016b) and revise it. We would like to thank an anonymous referee for his/her constructive and insightful comments, which improves the quality of the paper. We also gratefully acknowledge financial support from JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP15H03349 , JP15H05728 , and JP15K17060 , and the program of the Joint Usage/Research Center for {\textquoteleft}Behavioral Economics{\textquoteright} at ISER, Osaka University. The usual disclaimer applies. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2016 Elsevier B.V.",
year = "2017",
month = feb,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.021",
language = "English",
volume = "151",
pages = "1--3",
journal = "Economics Letters",
issn = "0165-1765",
publisher = "Elsevier",
}