TY - GEN

T1 - Improvement of linear equivalent circuit model to identify simultaneous switching noise current in cryptographic integrated circuits

AU - Iokibe, Kengo

AU - Amano, Tetsuo

AU - Okamoto, Kaoru

AU - Toyota, Yoshitaka

AU - Watanabe, Tetsushi

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - The authors previously proposed a method based on a linear equivalent circuit model to predict vulnerability of cryptographic devices before fabrication. The method was verified to demonstrate the correlation power analysis attack, a major side-channel attack method, to a cryptographic device with outstanding accuracy. However, no obvious correlation was seen between the equivalent current source modeling the generation of the simultaneous switching noise (SSN) current in the circuit model and the encryption operation used in the previous study. Therefore, in this study, we improved the topology of the linear equivalent circuit model matched with the physical construction of the power distribution network (PDN) and re-identified the equivalent current source. By comparing the improved current source with the encryption operation, obvious correlations between them were found with respect to the period of the round operation and the dependency of the SSN current on the Hamming distance between successive intermediates. The improved equivalent current source was applied on a Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) in which an Advance Encryption Standard (AES) circuit was implemented to simulate power traces that were confirmed to coincide with measured ones. Correlation between the simulated power traces and the power model was investigated using a set of 1000 plaintexts. As a result, the correlation coefficients agreed well with those for measured power traces. Improving the equivalent circuit model topology, thus, helped to identify the SSN current generated in the FPGA during the AES operation.

AB - The authors previously proposed a method based on a linear equivalent circuit model to predict vulnerability of cryptographic devices before fabrication. The method was verified to demonstrate the correlation power analysis attack, a major side-channel attack method, to a cryptographic device with outstanding accuracy. However, no obvious correlation was seen between the equivalent current source modeling the generation of the simultaneous switching noise (SSN) current in the circuit model and the encryption operation used in the previous study. Therefore, in this study, we improved the topology of the linear equivalent circuit model matched with the physical construction of the power distribution network (PDN) and re-identified the equivalent current source. By comparing the improved current source with the encryption operation, obvious correlations between them were found with respect to the period of the round operation and the dependency of the SSN current on the Hamming distance between successive intermediates. The improved equivalent current source was applied on a Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) in which an Advance Encryption Standard (AES) circuit was implemented to simulate power traces that were confirmed to coincide with measured ones. Correlation between the simulated power traces and the power model was investigated using a set of 1000 plaintexts. As a result, the correlation coefficients agreed well with those for measured power traces. Improving the equivalent circuit model topology, thus, helped to identify the SSN current generated in the FPGA during the AES operation.

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U2 - 10.1109/ISEMC.2013.6670526

DO - 10.1109/ISEMC.2013.6670526

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:84893203470

SN - 9781479904082

T3 - IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility

SP - 834

EP - 839

BT - Proceedings - 2013 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2013

T2 - 2013 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2013

Y2 - 5 August 2013 through 9 August 2013

ER -