Reconsideration of a negotiation procedure for buyback contract

Shin Tsurui, Yasuhiko Takemoto, Ikuo Arizono, Ryosuke Tomohiro, Takatoshi Suehiro

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Negotiation procedures between a supplier and a retailer in a supply chain model including buyback contract have been studied in recent years. The negotiation procedures in the above studies have consisted of three successive steps: (i) show the necessity that the conclusion of the contract based on a set of contract parameters brings respective incentives to both of the supplier and retailer, (ii) present a mutual relationship between contract parameters of guaranteeing simultaneously optimalities of both of the supplier and retailer, and (iii) determine a unique combination of contract parameters using the Nash bargaining theory. Through successive steps (i)-(iii), some sets of contract parameters have been screened step by step, and eventually, an optimal set of contract parameters has been uniquely decided in step (iii) as a bargaining solution. However, the mathematical significance of respective conditions derived in steps (i) and (ii) for the bargaining solution of step (iii) has not been fully explained. Therefore, we reconsider respective roles of steps (i) and (ii) in the negotiation procedure based on a supply chain model including buyback contract. Then, we confirm the usefulness of the negotiation procedure consisting of three successive steps in the preceding studies.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)314-317
Number of pages4
JournalJournal of Japan Industrial Management Association
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2017


  • Coordination
  • Incentive compatible condition
  • Nash bargaining solution

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Strategy and Management
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics


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