TY - JOUR
T1 - Which is better for durable goods producers, exclusive or open supply chain?
AU - Kitamura, Hiroshi
AU - Matsushima, Noriaki
AU - Sato, Misato
N1 - Funding Information:
An earlier version of this paper is titled “Exclusive Contracts in Durable Goods Markets.” We have benefited from many constructive comments from the coeditor and anonymous referees. We thank Keisuke Hattori, Akifumi Ishihara, Hirokazu Ishise, Hiroshi Kinokuni, Gordon Klein, Inés Macho‐Stadler, Chrysovalantou Milliou, Tomomichi Mizuno, Takeshi Murooka, as well as the conference participants at the 3rd Asia‐Pacific Industrial Organisation Conference (The University of Melbourne), EARIE 2019 (Universitat Pompeu Fabra), XXXIV Jornadas de Economía Industrial (Universidad Complutense de Madrid), Japan Association for Applied Economics, Spring Meeting (Nanzan University), and Japanese Economic Association, Autumn Meeting (Kobe University), and seminar participants at Osaka University (ISER and OSIPP) and Summer Workshop on Economic Theory (Otaru Chamber of Commerce & Industry). We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from JSPS KAKENHI grant numbers JP15H05728, JP17H00984, JP17K13729, JP18H00847, JP18K01593, JP19H01483, JP20H01507, JP20H05631, and JP21K01452, the Japan Center for Economic Research, and the program of the Joint Usage/Research Center for “Behavioral Economics” at the ISER, Osaka University. Although Matsushima serves as a member of the Competition Policy Research Center (CPRC) at Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), our paper does not reflect the views of JFTC. The usual disclaimer applies.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Wiley Periodicals LLC.
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - We explore the supply chain problem of a downstream durable goods monopolist, who chooses one of the following trading modes: an exclusive supply chain with an incumbent supplier or an open supply chain, allowing the monopolist to trade with a new efficient entrant in the future. The expected retail price reduction in the future dampens the profitability of the original firms. An efficient entrant's entry magnifies such a price reduction, causing a further reduction of original firms' joint profits. In equilibrium, the downstream monopolist chooses the exclusive supply chain to escape further price reductions, although it expects efficient entry.
AB - We explore the supply chain problem of a downstream durable goods monopolist, who chooses one of the following trading modes: an exclusive supply chain with an incumbent supplier or an open supply chain, allowing the monopolist to trade with a new efficient entrant in the future. The expected retail price reduction in the future dampens the profitability of the original firms. An efficient entrant's entry magnifies such a price reduction, causing a further reduction of original firms' joint profits. In equilibrium, the downstream monopolist chooses the exclusive supply chain to escape further price reductions, although it expects efficient entry.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85138001781&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85138001781&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/jems.12497
DO - 10.1111/jems.12497
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85138001781
SN - 1058-6407
JO - Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
JF - Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
ER -