TY - JOUR
T1 - Attractive target for tax avoidance
T2 - trade liberalization and entry mode
AU - Okoshi, Hirofumi
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2024.
PY - 2025/2
Y1 - 2025/2
N2 - Growing foreign direct investments (FDIs) have been observed in parallel to the development of tax avoidance by multinational enterprises; however, empirical evidence indicates the asymmetric effects of trade costs on a firm’s entry decision. To give a new rationale and insights into the impacts of transfer pricing and trade liberalization on a firm’s global activities, this study incorporates transfer pricing and investigates a foreign firm’s entry decision: exports, greenfield FDI (GFDI), or cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CM&As). We show that CM&A is the equilibrium entry mode when transfer pricing regulation is loose, whereas the choice between exports and GFDI depends on the fixed costs of GFDI. Moreover, trade liberalization increases the likelihood of CM&A but decreases that of exports because a reduction in trade costs enhances tax-avoidance efficiency due to more intrafirm trade, implying that tax avoidance in the form of CM&A becomes crucial as globalization progresses. Our welfare analysis shows that regulating CM&A based on consumers’ benefits may result in welfare reduction because profit shifting is most effective under CM&A and a host country’s tax revenue from the foreign firm increases. The results imply the importance of considering the link between international tax and antitrust policies.
AB - Growing foreign direct investments (FDIs) have been observed in parallel to the development of tax avoidance by multinational enterprises; however, empirical evidence indicates the asymmetric effects of trade costs on a firm’s entry decision. To give a new rationale and insights into the impacts of transfer pricing and trade liberalization on a firm’s global activities, this study incorporates transfer pricing and investigates a foreign firm’s entry decision: exports, greenfield FDI (GFDI), or cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CM&As). We show that CM&A is the equilibrium entry mode when transfer pricing regulation is loose, whereas the choice between exports and GFDI depends on the fixed costs of GFDI. Moreover, trade liberalization increases the likelihood of CM&A but decreases that of exports because a reduction in trade costs enhances tax-avoidance efficiency due to more intrafirm trade, implying that tax avoidance in the form of CM&A becomes crucial as globalization progresses. Our welfare analysis shows that regulating CM&A based on consumers’ benefits may result in welfare reduction because profit shifting is most effective under CM&A and a host country’s tax revenue from the foreign firm increases. The results imply the importance of considering the link between international tax and antitrust policies.
KW - Antitrust policy
KW - Cross-border mergers and acquisitions
KW - Economic integration
KW - Entry mode
KW - Transfer price
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85187443071&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1007/s10797-024-09830-3
DO - 10.1007/s10797-024-09830-3
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85187443071
SN - 0927-5940
VL - 32
SP - 238
EP - 270
JO - International Tax and Public Finance
JF - International Tax and Public Finance
IS - 1
M1 - 104153
ER -