TY - GEN
T1 - Coalition Analysis on Two Manufactures and Two Retailers Supply Chain via Cooperative Game Theory
AU - Saso, Taiki
AU - Nishi, Tatsushi
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, IFIP International Federation for Information Processing.
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - In this study, we consider a coalition analysis on the pricing problem for a decentralized supply chain model in which two manufacturers and two retailers with price competitions. In the pricing game, we analyze the equilibrium solutions with perfect competition, grand coalition and partial cooperation between manufacturers and retailers. The results show the externality between coalitions for supply chain members. Therefore, the pricing game is represented as a partition function game. The stable profit allocation in each alliance structure is obtained based on cooperative game theory for the partition function game. We derive the new finding that if there are multiple partial alliances within the same alliance structure, the profit within the partial alliance is smaller than the profit when there is only one partial alliance. Then, it is shown that the pessimistic and optimistic Shapley values of the manufacturers are lower than the optimistic personal alliance value of the manufacturer when the product substitutability is lower and the store substitutability is higher.
AB - In this study, we consider a coalition analysis on the pricing problem for a decentralized supply chain model in which two manufacturers and two retailers with price competitions. In the pricing game, we analyze the equilibrium solutions with perfect competition, grand coalition and partial cooperation between manufacturers and retailers. The results show the externality between coalitions for supply chain members. Therefore, the pricing game is represented as a partition function game. The stable profit allocation in each alliance structure is obtained based on cooperative game theory for the partition function game. We derive the new finding that if there are multiple partial alliances within the same alliance structure, the profit within the partial alliance is smaller than the profit when there is only one partial alliance. Then, it is shown that the pessimistic and optimistic Shapley values of the manufacturers are lower than the optimistic personal alliance value of the manufacturer when the product substitutability is lower and the store substitutability is higher.
KW - Cooperative game theory
KW - Partial coalition
KW - Shapley value
KW - Supply chain management
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U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-85906-0_67
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-85906-0_67
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85115341057
SN - 9783030859053
T3 - IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology
SP - 619
EP - 628
BT - Advances in Production Management Systems. Artificial Intelligence for Sustainable and Resilient Production Systems - IFIP WG 5.7 International Conference, APMS 2021, Proceedings
A2 - Dolgui, Alexandre
A2 - Bernard, Alain
A2 - Lemoine, David
A2 - von Cieminski, Gregor
A2 - Romero, David
PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
T2 - IFIP WG 5.7 International Conference on Advances in Production Management Systems, APMS 2021
Y2 - 5 September 2021 through 9 September 2021
ER -